Under the Pahlavi regime, and particularly since the 1960s, Israel and Persia enjoyed close ties, resulting in informal strategic alliance. The Iranians also used intelligence provided by the United States to find and kill Al-Qaeda (al-Qāʾda) leaders that were slipping into Iran from Afghanistan. These fears turned out to be unfounded, however. But they are engaged in diplomacy, albeit indirectly, as part of an ongoing effort to oversee a U.S. reentry into a 2015 nuclear deal abandoned three years ago by former President Donald Trump. Southern Lebanon had traditionally been the home of Lebanon’s disenfranchised Shiʿite Muslim community. According to Ephraim Inbar of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, “there was a feeling in Israel that, because of the end of the Cold War, relations with the U.S. were cooling and we needed some new glue for the alliance. 292-315. Iranian political strategist, New York, 26 February 2004. Much like the shah, Iran’s religious leaders sought a central role for Iran in the affairs of the region, but while the language through which the shah articulated Iran’s ambitions was one of Iranian nationalism, the clerics expressed the same aspirations through a religious lexicon. B. Gilad, “Paras,” Ha-Miazrah ha-Hadash 4/4, 1953. Members and supporters of Lebanon's Hezbollah movement and Palestinian refugees raise a Palestinian flag on a hill facing the Israeli northern town of Metula by the border in the country's south as members of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) watch, during a ceremony to mark Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Day, on May 7. After September 11, officials in the Ḵātami government convinced the conservative clerical establishment to provide Washington with considerable assistance in the war against the Taliban (Ṭālebān) and in the reconstruction of Afghanistan’s political system. The regional occurrences of 1958 (the formation of the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria in February, the collapse of Iraq’s pro-Western monarchy in July, and the subsequent collapse of the Baghdad Pact) augmented Persian concerns about Communist penetration and Arab radicalism and reinforced Persian decisions to enhance Israeli-Persian relations. In short, whereas the Iranian threat depiction served Rabin’s efforts to convince the Israeli public to support reconciliation with the Arabs, the very same Iranian threat depiction undermined Netanyahu’s efforts to convince Israelis to oppose that very same reconciliation. Israel had great difficulties coming to terms with the Revolution and the strategic setback of losing the shah’s support. The Israeli official expressed a lack of surprise at this development given the relations the group has with Tehran and Ankara. Russia fears an escalation between Iran and Israel and wants to avoid it at any cost. "So they tried to succeed in having terrorist attacks on Israel in the West Bank.". Eshaq Emran Shaoul, “Cultural Values and Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Iran: The Case of Iran’s Recognition of Israel,” Ph.D. Idem, Oil and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-63, London, 1988. A decision was made at the highest political levels to lower Israel’s profile on issues concerning Iran. Whenever an Israeli soldier was killed, Hezbollah confirmed it by listening to the Israeli radio and then sent the reports immediately to its satellite TV station, Al-Manar, which broadcast the news live. The opening of the Tiran Straits turned Eilat into a natural route for importing oil to Israel and later to Europe. Egypt and Jordan were the only two Arab nations to make peace with Israel before last year, when Trump helped oversee the Abraham Accords that also normalized Israel's relations with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco. Netanyahu and the Likud Party were ideologically opposed to the Oslo process and did not conceal their mistrust of the Palestinians. Israel adopted a very aggressive posture on Iran, echoing Iran’s venomous rhetoric against the Jewish state. Primarily, Iran needed Israel’s assistance in procuring American weaponry and spare parts for Iran’s American-built air force. According to an Israeli diplomat, Iran’s active participation against Israel began after its exclusion from the formation of the new Middle East order (Interview, Israeli UN diplomat, New York, 31 March 2004). 170-93). Secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, referring to the fighting, remarked on 21 July 2006 two days before her official trip to Israel to meet with Prime Minister Olmert: “What we are seeing here, in a sense, is the growing, the birth pangs of a new Middle East, and whatever we do we have to be certain that we are pushing forward to the new Middle East, not going back to the old one” (see www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006). Gary Sick, October Surprise: America’s Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan, New York, 1991. ), and Israel was viewed as a potential partner. Foreign Ministry documents reveal the depth of relations between Israel and the Shah's regime in Iran before the Islamic Revolution. Hamas and fellow Gaza-based group Palestinian Islamic Jihad have launched a barrage of what the Israel Defense Forces estimated to be at least 300 rockets so far targeting Israeli cities and settlements in response to an IDF raid on Jerusalem's revered Al-Aqsa Mosque. All six have since condemned Israel's raid on the Al-Aqsa Mosque and its handling of Palestinian protests. RELATIONS WITH IRAN,” Encyclopædia Iranica, XIV/2, pp. Furthermore, Israeli intelligence reports indicated that Iran was swiftly moving towards a nuclear weapons capability. Such an order must, by definition, be all-inclusive and reflect the reining geopolitical balance. Shlomo Ben-Ami, Israel’s former foreign minister, argued that “the question today is not when Iran will have nuclear power, but how to integrate it into a policy of regional stability before it obtains such power. After twenty-five years of Israeli investments into the relations with Iran, the ties to Tehran had become a crucial element of Israel’s regional strategy. As a result, Iraq remained Israel’s primary threat, and Iran its preferred partner in balancing Iraq. Thesis, Tel Aviv, 1989 (in Hebrew). By the end of the thirty-four day war, Hezbollah had won a stunning victory by simply having withstood and survived Israel’s onslaught. In fact, Tehran was expecting some form of Israeli offensive against its Shiʿite allies in Lebanon, though the Iranian intelligence services had predicted a much smaller Israeli campaign that would occur in the fall of 2006 (interview with senior Iranian official, 12 October 2006). diss., George Washington University, 1971. The outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War (q.v.) Rather than strengthening and reinforcing the image of Israel’s invincible deterrence, the war that was to weaken Iran only made Israel itself more vulnerable. ʿAbd-al-Nāṣer responded with harsh criticism, breaking all diplomatic ties with Persia (to be restored only in 1970). Approximately one quarter of those refugees were Shiʿites who had fled the violence in the south (Deeb, 2006). "And I really don't recommend for any of our enemies to join Hamas, because then they will be on the receiving end of the same type of attacks on military infrastructure that Hamas is now receiving and will be receiving.". The Lebanese fought a high-tech war and paid as much attention to the media battle as they did to the fighting on the ground. Daily news headlines & detailed briefings enjoyed by half a million readers. "The reason for the demonstrations and the firing of the rocket is trying to deter the Israeli occupation and its settlers and extremist Knesset Members who insist to desecrate Al-Aqsa Mosque, which is the third holiest place for all Muslims around the world and the holiest site for us as the Palestinians," a Hamas spokesperson told Newsweek. For Iran, the second Persian Gulf War provided an opportunity to improve its relations with Washington in order to break out of its isolation and return to a state in which Iran’s power in the region would be recognized and its role objectives met. From Israel’s perspective, the rise of a nuclear Iran and the defeat that Israel suffered in 2006 indicate that time may no longer be on its side. Former Iranian official, Tehran, August, 2004. Israel’s vision of the new Middle East order came at the expense of Iran since Yitzhak Rabin believed that the Israeli population would be unlikely to accept peace with the Arabs unless a greater and more ominous threat, namely Iran and Islamic fundamentalism, was looming in the horizon. The Israeli presence was in fact so large that it necessitated the opening of an Israeli school in Tehran. The distribution of relative power shifted towards Iran and Israel and formed a nascent bipolar structure in the region. Only months into his term, amid intensified American and Israeli threats against Iran over its nuclear program, Aḥmadi-nežād heated up Iran’s anti-Israel rhetoric by making inflammatory statements. A potential rapprochement could mean a de-escalation in their regionwide contention for influence and a recalibration of their top priorities. Currently, the State of Israel maintains diplomatic relations with 164 U.N. member states, while the State of Palestine maintains diplomatic ties with 138, though its role at the international body is that of a non-member observer state due to the unresolved nature of the conflict that's raged between the two peoples since the end of the United Kingdom's colonial mandate in 1948. Labor’s landslide victory, the Arabs’ military weakness, and the PLO’s near-collapse led the Labor Party to conclude that Israel’s long-term security would be better served by befriending the Arab states of Israel’s vicinity, instead of the non-Arab states in its periphery. During the 1948 war, Persia showed tacit solidarity with the Arab states, but proved reluctant to involve itself in combat. Eventually, however, Ḵātami’s efforts were hampered by his inability to improve relations with the United States, which in turn prevented Iran from gaining recognition for its rising power and moderated foreign policy. Lebanon is just a prelude to the greater war with Iran” (author’s conversation with Ephraim Sneh, 28 July 2006). Israeli imports from Persia, as shown in the official Israeli statistics, grew from $1.3m in 1967 to $2.7m in 1969, $4.5m in 1975, reaching $5.8m in 1977 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, XXI, p. 219, XXIX, p. 222). 213-223, 2007; available online at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/israel-i-relations-with-iran (accessed on 05 April 2012). It is also apparent that his close ties with Israel stemmed from an overestimation of the power of world Jewry. Iran continued to be viewed as a non-threat due to its lack of offensive capabilities. of 1955 also provided him with the sense of security that he needed to pursue his regional goals. Il est clair, du côté chinois, que le renforcement des liens bilatéraux ne revient pas à une alliance anti-occidentale. "They know that by doing that they're getting a lot of support from Palestinians in the West Bank, and actually, this whole thing about shooting rockets from the West Bank to Israel, that was their way to show the people in the West Bank that they are in charge of the situation.". Also on Wednesday, Israeli forces shot and killed a 16-year-old Palestinian boy in Nablus during a series of raids in search of the gunman. Interviews: Yossi Alpher, former Mossad official and senior advisor to Ehud Barak, Tel Aviv, 27 October 2004. David Menashri, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 26 October 26, 2004. Israel was well aware of the oppression of political opposition, promoted military and intelligence cooperation, and shared a fear of 'the power of the masses.' The persecution of Iraqi Jews and their immigration restrictions added to the urgency of forming Persian contacts, as Persia had become a transit point for Iraqi Jews (Sobhani, pp. Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas is calling for unity between Middle East rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia in hopes that their recent diplomacy will develop into more robust regional support for Palestinians embroiled in a sharp escalation in their decades-long conflict with Israel, which issued a threat against any foes seeking to join in on the spiraling conflict. 159-201; Fallāḥ-nežād, pp. Meir Ezri, a Persian native, was sent by the Israeli foreign ministry to Tehran in 1958 and remained there as minister and ambassador until 1973 (Ezri, pp. Haim Watzman, New York, 1988. The IRGC provided military training to Shi’ite Lebanese militias and was the driving force behind the formation of Hezbollah. Nežād-Ḥosayniān, Iran’s former ambassador to the UN 1997-2002, Tehran, 12 August 2004. IDF Radio, 10 November 1996. Israel’s initial contacts with Persia focused on issues relating to the Persian residents in Israel and the Jewish inhabitants of Persia. The high point of normalcy in Israel-Iran relations began in 1953 when a coup d’état brought the pro-Western Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to power and ended with the 1979 Revolution and the rise of Ayatollah Homeni. Depuis 1979, le nouveau régime a opéré un changement radical de sa politique étrangère, notamment concernant ses relations avec Israël. Neither Israel nor Iran existed to have relations back then - "Ancient" Israel is not the Israel of today, despite what romanticists would have you believe, and its politics are completely different. Although these hesitant initial steps gained significant momentum since the White Revolution (a series of economic and social reforms announced by the shah in January 1963), they remained informal. The UAE is the first Gulf Arab state to do so and only the third Arab nation to establish normalized relations with Israel, Iran's regional archenemy. The shah considered Israel a valuable tool for preoccupying ʿAbd-al-Nāṣer in the Arab-Israeli front, thereby preventing the spread of his creed to the Persian Gulf region. Relations Iran - Israël - USA: nouvelle donne. Indeed, the real turning point in Israeli-Iranian relations was not in 1979, but in 1991, since the end of the Cold War also ended the Iranian-Israeli cold peace. Radicalzation of Iranian government. These men were instrumental in translating the general understandings between the two parties into a network of intimate cooperation. Moreover, in the absence of an American assault on Iran, such a strategic pushback against Iran would be beneficial to both Israel and the United States. This pipeline initially transferred annually more than ten million tons of oil, which was more than Israel’s annual consumption (Ezri, pp. Sohrab Sobhani, The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988, New York, 1989. 58-169; Welāyati, 2001, p. 41; Fallāḥ-nežād, pp. So there were a lot of attempts during the first year after the Revolution, to see if we could revive the relations with [Iran]” (Interview, Tel Aviv, 22 October, 2004). 142-47). "In addition, to deter the Israeli authorities which have been working along with the settlers' organizations to expel the Palestinian families in Sheikh Jarrah from their homes and replace them with settlers.". Israel, with a potential future showdown with Iran in mind, seemed to have sought an opportunity to neutralize Hezbollah and Hamas in order to weaken Iran’s deterrence and retaliation capabilities. Following the fall of Moṣaddeq government through the coup d’état of 1953 (q.v. Currently, this rivalry, set in motion by the dramatic redistribution of power in the region following the Persian Gulf War and the ensuing efforts to establish a new regional order, is still in effect and has hampered the attainment of the United States foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. By the time the Labor Party swept the June 1992 elections, the need for bold action was evident. According to Israel former ambassador to the United States, Itamar Rabinovich, “in strict geo-political terms, if you don’t consider regimes, our friend should be Iran, and we should never forget that” (Interview, Tel Aviv, 17 October 2004). A peculiar scheme was also underway to pay a considerable sum of money to interested parties to help expedite the recognition (Hacham, pp. In September 1957, General Teymur Baḵtiār, deputy prime minister and head of the newly established SAVAK (Sāzmān-e eṭṭelāʿāt wa amniyat-e kešvar) met in Paris with the Israeli ambassador (Yaacov Zur) offering cooperation in the exchange of intelligence, a suggestion Israel warmly welcomed (Hacham, p. 81; Sobhani, pp. The long-running conflict between Israelis and Palestinians erupted into its most explosive violence in years as tensions over housing and worshipping rights came to a head. The Islamic Revolution. Iran and Israel Amid a Changing Strategic Landscape. News from Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish World. According to Dore Gold, “The Likud tended to be more open to the idea [that] maybe there are residual elements in the revolutionary regime that see things geo-politically the same way as it was during the shah’s time” (Interview, Jerusalem, 28 October 2004). 90-100; Bialer, 1985, pp. Sohrab Sobhani, The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988, New York, 1989; tr. Its nuclear and missile programs were viewed as a major threat to Israeli security, as was its alleged engagement in terrorism. Trump aligned much of his Middle East policies closely with that of Israel. L’attitude du […] The shah’s quest to legitimize Iran’s hegemony through American backing, strong ties and military aid to the regions moderate Arab government, and financial aid to the more radical Arab states, combined with public distancing from Israel, ultimately failed to persuade the Arabs to grant Iran the role it aspired. 203-28). During the 1948 war, some Persian residents of Palestine fled the country and their properties, like those of the Arabs who had left, were put under government custody. Cet incident n'est que le dernier épisode en date de la guerre larvée que se livrent la République islamique et l'État hébreu. ", In a read out of his calls with Haniyeh and Abbas, Erdogan called Israel's recent operations in Jerusalem "terror," and said he and his officials "would do everything in their power to mobilize the entire world, first and foremost the Islamic World, with a view to stopping the terror and occupation carried out by Israel.". 1 Jusqu’à la révolution khomeyniste de 1979 les relations entre l’Iran et Israël se caractérisèrent par leur efficacité. Tel Aviv was very concerned about Baghdad’s rise and looked toward Iran as a potential partner to contain Saddam’s ambitions (Alpher, p. 155). Israel considers post-revolutionary Iran its most significant strategic threat, with Iranian leaders serially calling for Israel’s destruction and also promoting Holocaust denial. "But talking, trying to take down tensions, trying to see if there's a modus vivendi, trying to get countries to take actions on things they're doing that you don't like—that's good, that's positive. Israel could become the dominant economic power in the Middle East in addition to its military domination, which would help regain its strategic importance in Washington.
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